Whereas classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau had traced international conflicts to the natural propensity of political leaders to seek to increase their power, neorealists (or structural realists) such as Waltz located the cause of war in the structure of international relations. Third, exploring how evolution intersects with other theories of international relations would advance the goal of consilience, fusing theoretical and empirical knowledge drawn from both the social and natural sciences. In other species, males cannot coerce females, but the females are choosy about with whom they mate, leading to selection pressures for males to demonstrate or signal their quality as attractive partners. However, rapid advances in the life sciences offer increasing theoretical and empirical challenges to scholars in the social sciences in general and international relations in particular, who are therefore under increasing pressure to address and integrate this knowledge rather than to suppress or ignore it. Debate continues as to whether modern states actually do, or should, behave in this way, but we are struck by a different question. Evolution is sometimes argued to operate on groups rather than individuals (group selection). Strikingly, therefore, behavioral dispositions that enhanced success in the small-scale intergroup anarchy of humans evolutionary past may have endowed us with behaviors that also enhance success in the anarchy of the international system. Offensive realism holds that states are disposed to competition and conflict because they are self-interested, power maximizing, and fearful of other states. Sexual selection has led to costly biological adaptations, such as fighting, the growth of heavy weapons (e.g., antlers), risky courtship displays, or adornments that signal genetic quality (e.g., gigantic tails). In 2003 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. As Mearsheimer and others acknowledge, power maximization may not always be a good strategy and, indeed, it has led a number of states into disaster. Some of these date from the split with our last nonhuman primate ancestor at the beginning of the Pliocene, around 5 million years ago. Offensive realism also does not have such expectations. Note: In all cases, we argue, holding onto the status quo is not always good enough to ensure survival. Behavior intention models, for example, assume people have: a linear time orientation (the future has meaning), an internal locus of control, and the ability to think in probabilistic terms. No theory is perfect. Psychologists argue that the ingroup/outgroup distinction develops from a need for social identity. They can only be regional hegemons. For an excellent general analysis of the genetic origins of aggression and its chemical mediators in humans such as the hormone testosterone, its derivative dihydroxytestosterone (DHT), neurotransmitters such as serotonin, and some of the differences in behavior caused by these factors in men and women, see William R. Clark and Michael Grunstein, In this respect, too, international politics resembles animal behavior. The most obvious challenge that evolutionary theory presents to international relations concerns our understanding of human nature. All anarchy does is remove constraints on pursuing such behavior. An evolutionary foundation offers a major reinterpretation of the theory of offensive realism and permits its broader application to political behavior across a wide range of actors, domains, and historical eras. Neorealism points to international anarchy, a phenomenon we can evaluate, as the ultimate cause of state behavior. Kenneth Waltz placed realism on a more scientific foundation by introducing a new realist theory: neorealism or structural realism. He also frequently participated in public debates by contributing op-ed articles to the The New York Times and other national newspapers. According to Waltz, the need for security leads states to favour the status quo and to adopt a defensive position toward their competitors. But what was that context? These findings may be surprising for those who hold to the popular notion of a harmonious and peaceful past in which humans were at one with nature and each other, but the evidence suggests the opposite. This insight has important implications for international politics because it suggests that we can potentially createat least in principleenvironments that take account of our human nature so we can turn them to our advantage, such as designing institutions that elicit cooperative rather than conflictual tendencies.Reference Keohane164,Reference Stein165. in evolutionary biology from Oxford University and a Ph.D. in political science from Geneva University. The genes of egoistic individuals survive and spread at the expense of those that fail to effectively put their own interests first. Humans survived (and note that several other Hominin species did not) by virtue of evolved behavioral traitsamong them egoism, dominance, and the ingroup/outgroup biaswhich were adaptations to competitive ecological conditions. Reading the literature of offensive realism can be hauntingly analogous to reading ethnographies of warfare among preindustrial societies such as the Yanomamo in the Amazon, the Mae Enga in New Guinea, or the Shuar in the Andes. Second, our argument makes two contributions to the theory of offensive realism: We ground the theory in human evolution (instead of the international system), and we extend it into new domains (beyond the interaction of states as units of analysis). The rest of the 500-plus page book more closely outlines. However, because anarchy is a problem both in nature and in international politics, it is no coincidence at all. We do not propose a nave transplant of nature red in tooth and claw (to quote Tennyson) into international politics. Table2 illustrates the range of domains to which an evolutionary theory of offensive realism applies. Utah's Office of Licensing, which provides oversight to youth residential treatment centers, has conducted 341 investigations in the past five years at Provo Canyon School's four campuses. The origins of warfare are rooted in the imperative to gain and defend resources necessary for survival and reproduction in dangerous and competitive conditions. Far from the original view of chimpanzees as boisterous but peaceful human cousins, researchers in recent decades have uncovered that these primates have a systematic tendency to kill males from rival groups.Reference Wilson, Boesch, Fruth, Furuichi, Gilby, Hashimoto, Hobaiter, Hohmann, Itoh, Koops, Lloyd, Matsuzawa, Mitani, Mjungu, Morgan, Muller, Mundry, Nakamura, Pruetz, Pusey, Riedel, Sanz, Schel, Simmons, Waller, Watts, White, Wittig, Zuberbuhler and Wrangham2,Reference Wrangham3,Reference Manson and Wrangham4 As primatologist Richard Wrangham put it, violence between groups of chimpanzees is like a shoot-on-sight policy.Reference Wrangham5 The strategic rationale is very simple: to eliminate rivals and increase territory. Any given individuals Darwinian fitness will be increased if they can successfully seize the resources of others at sufficiently low cost.Reference Buss and Shackelford71 Of course, warfare also may be waged for defensive reasons, such as to defend critical resources from the advances of others.72 E.O. Therefore, to advocate group selection over individual selection does nothing to reduce predictions regarding human conflict or aggression. We realize international cooperation is prevalent, but that does not mean such cooperation is easy to obtain. . On the contrary, it provides or adds to the reasons why we demand and need them, and indeed why they are so hard to establish and maintain. As such, an evolutionary account does not necessarily expect animals, humans, or states to act as offensive realists all the time and in all situations. In sum, evolutionary theory offers realist scholars a natural-scientific behavioral foundation for offensive realism. Theories purporting to explain human behavior make explicit or implicit assumptions about preferences and motivations, and mainstream theories in international politics are no exception. In addition to fighting over resources, we can now fight over ideology as well. The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. Evolutionary theorists now recognize, following William Hamiltons concept of inclusive fitness, that egoism has complexities. 1-49; Robert Gilpin, War and An article adapted from the book had previously been published by Foreign Affairs. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings. Mearsheimers other works included Conventional Deterrence (1983), Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988), Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011), The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), and scores of articles published in academic journals. By contrast, as rational actor theorists would expect, hunter-gatherers are averse to the risk of fighting symmetric battles with roughly equivalent numbers on each side.82 Importantly, sustained instances of imbalances of power over evolutionary history would have led to the selection of contingent aggression. On the importance of resource harvesting for the development of dominance hierarchies, see James L. Boone, Competition, conflict, and the development of social hierarchies, in. To the extent that cultural group selection extends back into our evolutionary past, cultural traits have not been consistently or powerfully contrary to the evolved traits of egoism, dominance, and ingroup/outgroup bias. Updates? However, a key insight from evolution is that the primacy of self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear does not necessarily condemn individuals or groups to competition and conflict; rather, these traits can in themselves give rise to cooperation and alliances. They write new content and verify and edit content received from contributors. The international order, in other words, is determined by the balance of power between states. Moreover, theorists of offensive realism argue that states should behave this way because it is the best way to survive in the anarchy of the international system. However, offensive realism is one of the most compelling current theories for explaining major phenomena across the history of international politics, such as great power rivalries and the origins of war. A caveat to this prediction is that women in power may tend to act like men, either because selection effects trump stereotypical sex differences (female leaders may have personalities similar to male leaders), or because egoism and dominance are necessary traits in order to survive in the system of international anarchy (or on Capitol Hill).Reference Fukuyama197,Reference Clift and Brazaitis198. The key finding is that humans quickly adopt an us (ingroup) versus them (outgroup) worldview. The role of war in the evolution of political systems and the functional priority of defense,, For an excellent review of the logic for, and evidence of, adaptations for war, see, Inclusive fitness has recently been the subject of a heated debate in the biological literature; see M. A. Nowak, Corina E. Tarnita, and Edward O. Wilson, The evolution of eusociality,, There is copious evidence from historical and contemporary times that such nepotism is a significant influence in politics. In this article, we ask whether the three core assumptions about behavior in offensive realismself-help, power maximization, and outgroup fearhave any basis in scientific knowledge about human behavioral evolution. Additionally,. Similarly formidable obstacles to cooperation exist in international relations. Therefore, even the strongest advocates of group selection, such as David Sloan Wilson, argue that, in any given case, it remains an empirical question as to whether or not the selection pressures acting at the level of individuals are outweighed by selection pressures potentially acting at the level of the group (so called multi-level selection). We recognize that humans are influenced by culture, norms, rational calculation, and moral principles. He expands on Waltz's idea of structure causing behaviour . Table4. Historically, evidence has often supported this hypothesis.199,200,201 However, we take the position that, on average, state leaders personal interests have significant and genuine overlap with national security interests, not least of which is the survival and prosperity of the state for themselves and their progeny. Our evolutionary approach predicts the same behavior as offensive realism but derives from a different ultimate cause. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that states behave as offensive realists predict not just because of anarchy in the modern international system but also because of the legacy of our evolution. First, such studies would complement and critique the present study. Chimpanzees do at least have some important ecological similarities to humans. First, ambitious leaders self-select themselves into seeking high-profile roles in the first place.Reference Ehrenhalt191 Second, strong leaders are selected into power over weak-willed or hesitant candidates.Reference Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren and Hall192,Reference Van Vugt and Ahuja193 Third, leaders rise to the top of their respective hierarchies through an intensively competitive process that compels them to be increasingly attentive to self-interest and self-preservation.Reference Shenkman194 Fourth, once in power, decision-makers tend to heed hawkish rather than dovish advice.Reference Kahneman and Renshon195 Fifth, the experience of power itself is well known to corrupt, precisely because being a leader elevates ones sense of worth and power.196 Taking these phenomena together, a skeptic of our argument that humans are generally egoistic, dominance-seeking and groupish may nevertheless concede that the small subset of humans that become political leaders tend to express these traits. Classical realists (such as Thucydides, E.H. Carr, Arnold Wolfers, and Hans Morgenthau) and offensive realists share the assumption that states seek to maximize power - that states are relentless seekers of power and influence.Specifically, for classical realists "nations expand their political interests abroad when their relative power increases . As Chinggis Khan is purported to have said: The greatest happiness is to vanquish your enemy, to drive him before you, to see his cities reduced to ashes.159 Although not usually expressed in such stark terms, the pleasure of competition and victory has been widely recognized as a feature of human nature from classical times to the present day, and success in competitive interactions and the domination of others are known to increase testosterone and dopamine responses in menthe so-called victory effect.160 Such dominance behavior is, we suggest, exaggerated among leaders because they are generally ambitious and competitive, and usually male.
